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THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23.1 IN ACTIONS BROUGHT
UNDER SECTION 36(B) OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
OF 1940
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 19401 ("ICA") im-
poses on the investment adviser of a registered investment company "a
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services." '2 An
action alleging a breach of this duty may be brought "by the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission, or by a security holder of a registered investment
company on behalf of such company" to recover excessive fees paid to the
investment adviser.3 The section does not provide an express right of action
in the investment company, itself. At first glance, it would appear that a
shareholder of a registered investment company has an unfettered right of
action under section 36(b) against the investment adviser. However, three
circuit courts of appeals have found it necessary to determine whether the
demand requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
must be satisfied before such a plaintiff-shareholder may maintain a section
36(b) action. 4 Rule 23.1 requires that prior to bringing a derivative action
to enforce the right of a corporation, a shareholder of the corporation must
formally demand that the corporation's board of directors pursue the claim. 5
1. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1982).
2. Id Section 36(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered
investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.
Id
3. Id Section 36(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:
An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by
a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such
company against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such
investment adviser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this
section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or pay-
ments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or pay-
ments paid by such registered investment company or by the security
holders thereof to such investment adviser or person.
Id
4. See Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85
(1982); Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982); Fox
v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1271
(1983).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Rule 23.1 states in pertinent part as follows:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members
to enforce a right of a corporation ..., the corporation . having failed
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, . the complaint
(978)
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In two of the cases to reach the court of appeals, the First and Third
Circuits held that because the investment company has an implied right of
action under section 36(b), demand must be made as a prerequisite to a
plaintiff-shareholder bringing suit.6 However, in the third case, Fox v. Reich
& Tang, Inc. ,7 a decision in which the Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari,' the Second Circuit could find no implied cause of action by the com-
pany against its investment adviser under section 36(b).9 Consequently, the
court held that the requirements of Rule 23.1 need not be satisfied, and that
a plaintiff-shareholder need not make a demand on the company's directors
prior to instituting suit. °
In order to understand the import of the issues raised in Fox, it is not
only necessary to examine the history of the investment company industry
but also to analyze the unique relationship that exists between a mutual
fund, one type of investment company, and its investment adviser. This note
will begin with a discussion of the conflict of interest engendered by the rela-
tionship between an investment company and its investment adviser. It will
then examine the legislative efforts to remedy this conflict that lead to the
Congressional amendment of the ICA to include section 36(b). It will then
focus on the interaction between section 36(b) and the demand requirement
of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The issues raised by
the interaction of section 36(b) and Rule 23.1 are (1) does the investment
company have an implied cause of action under section 36(b) necessary to
shall . . . allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action he desires from the directors. . . and the reasons for his
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
Id For a general discussion of the demand requirement, see generally, Comment, The
Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
168 (1976).
Judicial interpretation of the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 has been incon-
sistent in the various federal circuits. See 3B J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE $ 23.119 (2d ed. 1982). Professor Moore in discussing the inconsistencies
expressed that "there is no unanimity of opinion among the courts, and probably the
most straightforward approach is to admit frankly that it lies within the sound discre-
tion of the court to determine the necessity for a demand." Id Generally, the
Supreme Court has chosen not to hear controversies involving conflicts in the appli-
cation of the demand requirement of Rule 23.1, instead allowing each circuit to de-
velop its own standards. Comment, supra, at 171. There are, however, Supreme
Court cases predating the enactment of Rule 23.1 which discuss the demand on di-
rectors requirement. See Wathen v. Jackson Oil and Ref. Co., 235 U.S. 635 (1915);
Delaware & H. Co. v. Albany & S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435 (1909); Doctor v. Harrington,
196 U.S. 579 (1905); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455
(1903); Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U.S. 489 (1888); Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241 (1887);
Dimpfell v. Ohio & M. Ry., 110 U.S. 209 (1884); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1982).
6. Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982);
Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982).
7. 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
8. 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
9. 692 F.2d at 253.
10. Id. at 262.
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trigger the requirements of Rule 23.1; (2) assuming an implied cause of ac-
tion does exist, is demand required in a section 36(b) action; and (3) should
demand always be presumed futile in a section 36(b) action due to the na-
ture of the relationship between investment company directors and the in-
vestment adviser. Finally, following a discussion of these issues, an argument
will be made that no demand is necessary in an action under section 36(b)
because no implied cause of action exists, and, therefore, Rule 23.1 should
not be invoked.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM: THE MUTUAL FUND, THE ICA AND
RULE 23.1
Investment companies1" first appeared in the early 1920's and quickly
gained popularity as a result of their ability to allow an investor to diversify
his portfolio at a low cost. 12 During the late nineteen-twenties and early
nineteen-thirties, investment companies sustained substantial economic
losses. 13 Although this financial decline was due in large measure to the
stock market crash of 1929,14 considerable economic difficulties resulted
11. Investment companies are organizations that sell their shares to the public
and then use the proceeds to invest in corporate and governmental securities. Note,
Mutual Fund Independent Directors. Putting a Leash on the Watchdogs, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 568 (1979). This note will focus on mutual funds, a type of investment com-
pany which at least one commentator has claimed are economically the most signifi-
cant segment of the investment company industry. See Comment, Termination of
Management Contracts Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 733
(1963). A mutual fund is an "open-end" type of investment company whose shares
are continuously offered to the public and which are redeemable at any time by the
shareholder for their net asset value. Modesitt, The Mutual Fund-A Corporate Anamoly,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1252 (1967).
Another type of investment company is the "close-end" company which sells its
shares in normal market transactions. Id. at n.2. These shares are neither redeem-
able nor offered on a continuing basis. Id
12. Note, Director Dismi sal of Shareholder Derivative Suits Under the Investment Com-
pany Act. Burks v. Lasker, 11 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 519, 523-24 (1980). The normal
investor has neither the time it takes to become an expert in all of the stocks and the
securities which are offered to the public, nor the financial resources necessary to
invest in enough different stocks to sufficiently diversify his portfolio to minimize
market risks. The investment company, which combines the assets of a number of
investors to invest in a diversified portfolio under the supervision of a professional
investment adviser, provides such opportunities for the average investor. Tolins, The
Investment Company Act of1940, 26 CORNELL L. REV. 77, 83 (1940). The initial success
of the investment company is shown by the fact that by 1929 there were 600 invest-
ment companies totalling over eight billion dollars in assets. Note, supra, at 524. For
a general discussion of the development of investment companies, see BULLOCK, THE
STORY OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES (1959).
13. SEC Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Pursuant to
§ 30 of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935. Part III, ch. 1, 2 (1940). Total
investment company assets dropped to a low of two billion dollars in 1932. Id. at 17.
During this period many investment companies were forced into bankruptcy, receiv-
ership or dissolution. Tolins, supra note 12, at 82.
14. For a general discussion of the stock market crash of 1929 see G. AXON, THE
STOCK MARKET CRUSH OF 1929 (1974); J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH OF 1929
(1972).
[Vol. 28: p. 978
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from fund mismanagement and organizer self-dealing.1 5 In an attempt to
regulate both investment companies as well as the securities industry as a
whole, thereby protecting the investment public from these and similar
abuses, 16 Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1" However, these initial attempts to regulate invest-
ment companies proved to be inadequate; even after their passage,
"manipulative schemes, pyramiding, exorbitant advisory and underwriting
fees, insider dealings and looting" persisted as problems with the investment
company form.' 8 In 1940, Congress passed the Investment Company Act to
deal with these continuing abuses. 19 While the ICA was generally successful
in preventing abuses of the investment company form, one serious problem
remained: the inherent conflict of interest existing between the mutual fund
15. Note,supra note 12, at 524.
16. These abuses included: 1) investments by investment companies in illiquid
ventures which benefited only those individuals in control of the investment com-
pany; 2) pyramiding, a practice of investing in the securities issued by other invest-
ment companies and creating duplicated management fees; 3) purchases by the
investment company of unwanted securities held by persons in control of the fund at
unreasonably high prices; 4) looting of company assets by insiders; 5) "switching", a
practice which involves setting up a second investment company and inducing share-
holders of the first to switch their investment to the second solely to generate sales
commissions. See Comment, The Mutual Fund Industy: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 732, 787-92 (1969).
17. Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors, 1972 DUKE L.J. 429, 433-
34. For the text of these Acts, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78hh-1 (1982). Mutual
funds are covered by the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 because they issue their own securities and distribute them directly through
their own salesmen or others. Randall, Fiducta.y Duties of Investment Company Directors
and Management Companies Under the Investment CompanyAct of 1940. 31 OKLA. L. REV.
635 (1978). The 1933 and 1934 acts impose disclosure and anti-fraud provisions on
corporations issuing securities and on those entities through which the securities are
traded. Comment, supra, at 434.
18. Comment, supra note 11, at 736. The Securities Acts, which focus on requir-
ing complete and truthful disclosure of all material facts to the investing public,
proved to be inadequate when dealing with investment companies. Id. See also Ran-
dall, supra, note 17, at 637 n. 13.
19. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1982). The ICA has been termed "the most
complex of the Federal securities acts." Note, supra note 12, at 526. The ICA as
enacted in 1940 contained the following requirements: 1) registration of all invest-
ment companies, Investment Company Act of 1940, § 17, Pub. No. 768, 54 Stat. 815-
17 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1982)); 2) disclosure of investment
and financing policies, id. § 13, 54 Stat. 811 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80-
13 (1982)); 3) regulation of the custody of assets, id. § 30, 54 Stat. 836-37 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1982)); 4) adequate reserves for redemption, and
prohibiting transactions between the fund and it's officers, directors and affiliates
unless SEC approved, id § 22, 54 Stat. 823-25 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-22 (1982)); 5) that a percentage of the fund's directors be independent of the
investment adviser; and 6) approval of the advisory contract by the shareholders,
subject to periodic negotiations. Id §§ 10, 16, 54 Stat. 806-08, 812-13 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10 & -15(a) (1982)). The act also made it a federal
crime to convert, embezzle, or steal investment company assets. Id. § 37, 54 Stat. 841
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1982)).
NOTE
4
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and its investment adviser.20 This conflict of interest derived from both the
structure of the mutual fund and the relationship of the investment adviser
to the fund.
While, in theory, a mutual fund is created by a group of investors who
pool their assets in order to reduce investment costs, in reality it is formed by
an existing management composed of investment bankers, brokers or invest-
ment counselors who seek to promote wider use of their services. 2 1 The
structure of the mutual fund is unique because an investment adviser hired
by the fund not only organizes the fund, but also, selects its first board of
directors. 2 2 The board of directors of the fund and the fund's investment
adviser then enter into a written contract setting forth the compensation to
be paid the adviser for managing the assets of the fund.23 Because the fee is
20. Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. REV. 696, 697 (1972). For a further discussion of this inherent conflict, see
notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text, infra. The relationship between the adviser
and the investment company has been described as "business incest" and a "corpo-
rate anomaly." Modesitt, supra note 18, at 1252; Note, The Mutual Fund and Its Man-
agement Company." An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137 (1961).
21. Comment, supra note 11, at 735. As one commentator observed: "The fund
is organized and promoted by persons who usually have an existing investment man-
agement organization, such as a brokerage house or an investment banking firm."
Randall, supra note 17, at 636.
22. Freeman, The Use of Mutual Fund Assets to Pay Marketihg Costs, 9 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 533, 534 (1978); Note, supra note 11, at 570-71. It has been observed, that
"[u]nlike a regular business corporation whose affairs are 'internally managed' by its
officers and board of directors, the assets of most mutual funds are externally man-
aged by an investment adviser." Freeman, supra, at 534. The investment adviser is
usually a member of an investment management corporation, a corporation which
specializes in providing professional investment advice. The investment manage-
ment corporation, or investment adviser, externally manages the fund. It is for this
reason that mutual funds have been characterized as mere corporate "shells." Note,
supra note 11, at 571. The adviser may also serve as underwriter to the fund when its
shares are offered to the public or as broker for the fund's portfolio transactions. Id.
23. Note, supra note 11, at 571. The ICA requires that the parties enter into a
written contract fully describing any compensation which the adviser is to receive.
Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1982). Because the
members of the fund's board of directors have been selected by, or have close ties
with, the investment adviser, they are often faced with the conflicting interests of
maximizing profits for the adviser and representing the best interests of the share-
holders by negotiating the lowest fees possible. Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties
and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058,
1059-60 (1967). Because of this peculiar relationship it has been stated that in the
mutual fund industry "self-dealing is not the exception but so far as management is
concerned, the order of the day." Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (1st Cir.), rev'g,
316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass 1970),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). Due to the fact that
affiliated directors have picked the independent directors and that the latter must
rely on the adviser for all statistical and accounting information necessary for analy-
sis of the adviser contract, even the ICA's statutory requirement that a percentage of
the board of directors be independent does not preclude abuse. Note, Pri'vate Rights of
Action Against Mutual Fund Investment Advisers." Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U.
PA. L. REV. 143, 145-46 (1971). See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 15(a), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1982) (requiring that no registered investment company have
more than 60% of its directors interested).
5
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set as a percentage of the fund's net assets, the amount of compensation paid
to the adviser increases as the assets of the fund continue to grow. 24 This
parallel asset-fee increase results even in the absence of an accompanying
increase in the services performed by the adviser.25
Between 1959 and 1966, more than eighty civil suits were filed by share-
holders of mutual funds who alleged that the compensation paid to a partic-
ular investment adviser was legally excessive.2 6 However, only three cases
were tried on the merits, and in none of these actions was the position of the
shareholder upheld.2 7 Responding to plaintiffs' failures in advisory-fee liti-
gation, in 1966, the SEC undertook a study of the ICA and its potential
impact on mutual fund growth. 28 The SEC report concluded that the ex-
isting external management structure of the mutual fund industry effectively
precluded shareholders from benefiting from decreased management costs.2 9
24. Fees were traditionally fixed at 0.50% of the fund's net assets. See e.g., Saxe
v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962). Since § 36(b) has been added to the
ICA, many mutual funds have set the adviser fees on a sliding scale which allows a
reduction in the percentage rate as the assets of the fund reach specified plateaus. See,
e.g., Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982). But see,
e.g. , Fox, 692 F.2d at 250 (fixed rate set at 0.50% of net assets).
25. Comment, supra note 11, at 736. The mere existence of these contracts is a
valuable asset to management. Id
26. Modesitt, supra note 11, at 1260. With the exceptional growth of the mutual
fund industry in the 1950's and 1960's, many adviser's fees became enormous. Com-
ment, supra note 18, at 743 & n.73. The suits were brought under both the ICA and
the common-law doctrine of corporate waste. Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the
Emerging "Federal Corporation Law" Directorial Responsibti'ty Under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 181, 204 (1966).
27. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 549 (D. Colo. 1963) (advisory
fee of 0.50% of net assets was not excessive because it was not "unconscionable and
shocking" due to the fact that the services were incapable of evaluation); Saxe v.
Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (1962) (in suit based on corporate
waste theory, payment of adviser fee of 0.50% of average daily net assets of the fund
was reasonable and plaintiff shareholders who have ratified such an advisory contract
must show that "what the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no
person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corpora-
tion has paid"); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 568, 170 A.2d 720, 723
(1961) (no liability where majority of the fund's unaffiliated and unbiased directors
and shareholders had approved the compensation agreement).
28. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,
H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PPI]. The
SEC report was based on the findings of a study conducted by the securities research
unit of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Penn-
sylvania. Fox, 692 F.2d at 257. The ICA authorized the SEC to commission studies
involving the ramifications of further increases in the size of investment companies
and how that might effect investors. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 14, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-14(b) (1982).
29. PPI, supra note 28, at 1. The SEC found that there was no competition
among various advisers for the contracts with the mutual funds. Id at 126-27. The
SEC further found that the ICA requirement that shareholders ratify the advisory
contract was inadequate to protect against excessive adviser fees. Id at 130. Like-
wise, the ICA provision providing for shareholder election of fund directors was
found to be ineffective. Id at 129-31.
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Pursuant to proposals contained in the SEC study, 30 the ninety-first Con-
gress added section 36(b) to the ICA.3 1 Section 36(b) imposes on the invest-
ment adviser a fiduciary duty to the mutual fund regarding the amount of
the management fees he can receive.
3 2
III. THE ISSUE: iS DEMAND REQUIRED IN AN ACTION
UNDER SECTION 36(b)?
From the date of its enactment, section 36(b) has engendered litigation,
the primary focus of which has been on the relationship between that section
and Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33 Because the de-
mand requirement of Rule 23.1 only applies when a shareholder attempts to
"enforce a right which may properly be asserted" by the corporation, 34 the
preliminary question of whether a mutual fund may properly assert a cause
30. Id at 143-47. The SEC proposed a requirement that the fees be reasonable.
Id at 144. Although in § 36(b) of the ICA, as amended in 1970, the term "fiduciary
duty" is substituted for "reasonable," one court has held this change to be "a more
semantical than substantive compromise," designed only to shift the focus of the stan-
dard from the fund directors to the investment adviser. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch
Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 1877
(1983).
31. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1981).
For portions of the text of § 36(b), see notes 2 & 3, supra.
32. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. 80a-35(b) (1982). The
approach Congress took in drafting § 36(b) precludes the results reached in earlier
cases where shareholders were denied relief on allegedly excessive fees due to director
approval and shareholder ratification of the advisory contract, due to the fact that
under § 36(b), director approval and shareholder ratification became only two of the
factors to be considered by the court in determining the fairness of the adviser's fee.
Mutual Fund Amendments.- Hearings on HR. 11995, S 222, HR. 13751 & HR. 11737
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 188-89 (1969) (memorandum of Philip Loomis, Gen-
eral Counsel, SEC). For a discussion of these earlier cases, see note 27 and accompa-
nying text, supra.
The standard applied to determine if there has been a breach of the fiduciary
duty is "whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would
have been negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of the surrounding circum-
stances." Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1877 (1983). Other factors in the court's deter-
mination of whether a fee is so excessive as to be a breach of fiduciary duty include
the following: rates other investment advisers charge similar funds; the adviser's costs
in providing the service; whether the adviser realizes economies of scale as the fund's
assets expand; and the nature and quality of the services provided. Id. at 929-30. For
a general discussion of the standard for imposing a fiduciary duty on an adviser with
respect to their fees under § 36(b), see Comment, Mutual Fund Advisoy Fees-Too Much
for Too Little?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 530 (1980).
33. See, Fox, 692 F.2d at 250. Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692
F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 85 (1982).; Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 91 F.R.D.
524 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Boyko v.
Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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of action under section 36(b) is raised. 35
A. The Mutual Fund and Section 36(b). Is There An Imphed Cause of Actzln?
Because section 36(b) does not explicitly authorize a suit by an invest-
ment company, 36 federal case law must be examined to determine whether it
is proper to imply such a cause of action.37 Where a federal statute fails to
expressly provide a remedy, federal courts have often been called upon to
imply remedies they deem are necessary to effect the Congressional purpose
behind the statute.38 In Cori v. Ash ,9 the Supreme Court established a four-
part test to determine when an implied cause of action exists under a federal
35. For a discussion of whether a mutual fund may properly assert a cause of
action under section 36(b), see notes 50-76 and accompanying text, infra.
36. See notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text, supra.
37. The first courts to construe section 36(b) held that the investment company
was not granted an express cause of action, but failed to see the significance of this in
light of Rule 23.1. See, e.g., Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (allegations of complaint were sufficient to excuse demand required
by Rule 23.1).
38. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). See Mishkin, The Variousness
of "Federal Law " Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for
Deciston, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963). The first case to recognize an im-
plied private cause of action under a federal statute was Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). The Supreme Court in R'gsby implied a cause of action
under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts. Id at 40 (citing Federal Safety Appliance
Act, Act of March 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C.
§ I et seq. (1976). Rigsby, a railroad worker, was injured as a result of his employer's
failure to provide the secure ladders required by the Act to be on all railroad cars. Id
at 36-37. Subsequent cases, however, have interpreted the Federal Safety Appliance
Acts not to imply a private cause of action. See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 206 F.2d 153 (1st
Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 909 (1954) (per curiam).
InJ. Case Co. v. Borak, the Court observed that an implication of private federal
actions would be proper in cases where such an action was both consistent with the
intent of Congress in passing the statute and necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the statute. 377 U.S. at 432-33. After noting this rule, the Court held that sharehold-
ers have an implied cause of action for violations of § 14 (a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. Id The Court found that one of Congress' principle purposes in
enacting § 14 was to protect the shareholders; that private enforcement of § 14 was
necessary to supplement actions by the SEC; and that no adequate remedies were
available to shareholders under existing state laws. Id at 332-35. See Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
In the decade which followed Borak both the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts used the liberal standard of Borak to find implied rights of action under
numerous federal statutes. See, e.g. , Comment, Imphed Rights of Action in Federal Legis-
lation: Harmonization Wthin the Statutoty Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928, 930 n.5.
39. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, a shareholder of the Bethlehem Steel Corp.
brought an action against that corporation and members of its board of directors
seeking both injunctive and compensatory relief for violations of § 610 of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act. Id at 71-72. For the text of
§ 610, see Federal Elections Campaign Act, § 610, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (repealed 1976).
The statute, which prohibited the expenditure of corporate funds in connection with
specified federal elections, provided only for criminal sanctions. 422 U.S. at 78.
NOTE
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statute. 40 Under the Cori standard, a court is to consider the following fac-
tors: 1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class Congress intended to
benefit by enacting the statute; 2) whether the legislative history of the stat-
ute indicates a Congressional intent to create or deny an implied private
remedy; 3) whether implying a cause of action is consistent with the purpose
of the statute; and 4) whether state law has traditionally regulated the area
addressed by the statute.
4 1
The Supreme Court subsequently invoked the Cori test to deny implied
causes of action under a number of federal statutes.42 Several courts of ap-
peals, however, continued to imply private rights of action under federal
statutes despite the Cori test's limitations.
43
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,44 and Transamertca Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis,45 the United States Supreme Court further narrowed the avail-
40. 422 U.S. at 78. The test was more restrictive than earlier standards used to
determine whether an implied right of action was proper and was intended to limit
the imposition of private rights of action. See McMahon & RodosJudicial ImphCation
of Private Causes of Action. Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167, 183
(1975); Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 21 (1978).
41. 422 U.S. at 78. Applying these four factors, the Court determined that:
1) the statute was not enacted for the benefit of Bethlehem Steel's shareholders; 2) the
primary purpose of the statute, the elimination of corporate influence over the out-
come in Federal elections, was not furthered by the implication of a private right of
action; and 3) the internal affairs of the corporation are traditionally determined
pursuant to state law. Id at 81-85. The Court, therefore, concluded that no implied
private right of action could exist under § 610. Id. at 85.
42. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (no implied right of ac-
tion under the Freedom of Information Act); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978) (no private right of action under Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (no private right of
action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
43. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 741 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell in his dissent in Cannon referred to twenty circuit courts'
decisions in which the Cort factors had been used to imply a private cause of action,
and concluded that "[i]t defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Con-
gress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." Id. at 742
(Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell expressed dissatisfaction with the four factor
Cort test because only the second factor required an examination of Congressional
intent, while the other three factors "invite[d] independent judicial lawmaking." Id.
at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
44. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross, the court-appointed trustee for the in-
solvent securities brokerage firm, Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), brought an action
against Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross), Weis' certified public accountant from
1969 to 1973. Id at 563. The trustee alleged that Touche Ross had improperly au-
dited and certified Weis' books and records and further that the reports Weis had
prepared for the SEC as required by § 17(a) and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder
were therefore inaccurate. Id. at 563-65. For the text of Rule 17a-5, see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-5 (1980). The trustee further claimed that Touche Ross' actions violated
§ 17(a) and prevented the disclosure of Weis' true financial condition until liquida-
tion of the brokerage firm became imminent. 442 U.S. at 565-66. The Court found
no private cause of action could be implied from § 17a. Id. at 569-71. For the con-
tent of§ 17(a), see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1982).
45. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). In Transamerica, a shareholder of a real estate investment
9
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ability of implied rights of action under federal statutes, holding that only
the second Cori factor, congressional intent, is relevant, and that no cause of
action can be implied absent the presence of such intent in the statutory
scheme or the statute's legislative history.46 In Middlesex County Sewerage Au-
thority v. Sea Clammers Association ,47 the Supreme Court again expressed its
intention to limit the availability of the implied cause of action.48 The Sea
Clammers Court concluded that the existence of elaborate enforcement provi-
sions in a federal statute would, without "strong indicia of a contrary con-
gressional intent," indicate that no implied cause of action was intended.
49
trust brought an action against certain trustees alleging violations of §§ 206 and 215
of the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940. Id at 13-17. The Court allowed the plain-
tiffs to pursue their claim under § 215 seeking rescission of the investment contract,
an injunction against enforcement of the contract, and restitution. Id. at 19. The
Court believed that Congress must have intended to recognize those customary legal
incidents which would necessarily follow from Congress' declaration in § 215 that all
contracts which were in violation of the Act were void. Id The Court, however,
found that no private right of action exists under § 206 of the Investment Adviser's
Act. For the content of §§ 206 and 215, see Investment Adviser's Act of 1940, §§ 206,
215, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, 80b-15 (1982).
46. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76; Transameri'a, 444 U.S. at 15-16, 23-24. In
Transamerica, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, emphasized that the existence
of an implied cause of action turns on statutory construction and not on the desirabil-
ity of providing remedies which the courts think will best effectuate the purpose of
the statute. 444 U.S. at 15. In both cases, the Court found the legislative history to
be silent as to Congress' actual intent. Id. at 18; 442 U.S. at 571. The Transamerica
Court admitted that silence alone would not "automatically undermine" an implied
cause of action, but stated that such silence was "hardly helpful." 444 U.S. at 18.
The Court further stated that silence would create a presumption that no private
cause of action was intended unless the "language or structure of the statute" or the
"circumstances of its enactment" suggested otherwise. Id Touche Ross and Tansamer-
ica relegated the remaining factors of the Cori test to use in the determination of
Congressional intent. 442 U.S. at 575-76; 444 U.S. at 15-16, 23-24.
47. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
48. Id. In Sea Clammers, a group of fishermen brought an action seeking injunc-
tive relief and damages against various governmental entities for injuries allegedly
caused by the dumping of sewage sludge into the ocean. Id at 5-6. The plaintiff
argued that there was an implied right of action under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1948 and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of
1972. Id at 10-11. For the respective provisions of these acts, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1-
1376 and 1401-1444 (1976). The Court noted that the statutes specifically conferred
authority on government officials and private citizens to enforce the act by means of
an injunction or the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. 453 U.S. at 13-14.
After noting the existence of this language, the Court stated as follows:
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies
for private citizens . . . . In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary
congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.
Id at 14-15.
49. 453 U.S. at 15. Sea Clammers was one of five cases heard by the Supreme
Court in 1981 which involved implied rights of action; in all five opinions the justices
refused to imply a private right of action under the federal statute in question. See
id.; Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (no private
right of action under Sherman or Clayton Acts); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
10
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Recently, the specific question of whether an investment company has
an implied cause of action under section 36(b) has been thoroughly analyzed
by three circuit courts of appeals. 50 In Grossman v.Johnson,5' the First Circuit
concluded that there exists an implied cause of action under section 36(b).
5 2
In reaching its result, the court of appeals stressed that it could not believe
that an independent board of directors would be precluded from recovering
excessive fees from the investment advisor. 53 The court opined that "Con-
gress could well have believed that ...it was unnecessary to say with par-
ticularity that the investment company would have a cause of action."
54
In Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc. ,'55 the Third Circuit similarly
287 (1981) (no right of action under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbours Appropriation
Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77
(1981) (no private right of action under the Equal Pay Act of 1963); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (no private right of action under Davis-
Bacon Act of 1931).
The Supreme Court has, however, carved out an exception to the line of cases
limiting implied rights of action. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct.
683 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
In Curran, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether implied rights of ac-
tion under the Commodity Exchange Act had survived the passage of significant
amendments to the Act in which Congress failed to codify the implied rights of ac-
tion. 456 U.S. at 374. The Curran Court held that since "Congress is presumed to be
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change," that such silence indicates
that Congress intended to retain the implied statutory rights of action created by the
courts. Id at 382, n. 66.
In Huddleston, the Court held that an implied right of action existed under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though express rights of action
were available to the plaintiff under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 103 S. Ct. at
689. The Court based its decision, at least in part, on the fact that "when Congress
comprehensively revised the securities laws in 1975, a consistent line of judicial deci-
sions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under Section 10(b) regardless of the availability
of express remedies." Id
50. See Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982)
(finding implied cause of action); Fox, 692 F.2d at 250 (finding no implied cause of
action); Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982)
(finding implied cause of action).
51. 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 85 (1982).
52. Id at 120.
53. Id.
54. Id The Grossman court cited two additional factors in support of its conclu-
sion that an investment company has an implied private right of action under
§ 36(b). First, the court found that the statute states that any recovery is to be "on
behalf of such company," language traditionally implying the action is derivative in
nature. Id Second, the court noted that the plaintiff had brought the action under
the assumption that it was derivative in nature. Id
55. 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982). On May 7, 1980, Weiss, as custodian for his
minor son, brought a shareholder suit on behalf of the Temporary Investment Fund,
Inc., against Provident Institutional Management Corporation, the fund's adviser,
Shearson Loeb Rhoads, Inc., the fund's underwriter, and all seven members of the
fund's board of directors. Id. at 931. Weiss charged the defendants with breach of
the fiduciary duties imposed on them by § 36(b). Id. at 931-32. The adviser's con-
tract in question failed to provide for reduction in fees to the adviser after the fund's
11
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held that an implied cause of action exists under section 36(b). 5 6 The Third
Circuit, however, went beyond the First Circuit's analysis and examined sec-
tion 36(b) in light of the four-factor test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Core.57 Examining each of the factors in the Cori test, the Third Circuit
found: (1) the investment company was the intended beneficiary of section
36(b); 58 (2) Congress' silence implied that the corporation was intended to
have a cause of action even though there was no explicit evidence of such an
intent in the legislative history;59 (3) a cause of action by the corporation is
consistent with the underlying purpose of section 36(b);60 and (4) an implied
cause of action would not interfere with an area of law "traditionally rele-
gated to state law."
6 1
Dissenting in Weiss, Judge Gibbons disagreed that the Cori test was the
proper test to apply.6 2 He noted that subsequent Supreme Court cases had
severely limited the implication doctrine, 63 requiring a "clear indication of
congressional intent" to imply a cause of action under a federal statute.
64
assets reached a certain level. For a discussion of implied causes of action, see notes
44-57 and accompanying text supra.
56. 692 F.2d at 934-36.
57. Id The court acknowledged the First Circuit's opinion in Grossman, but
found the support for that court's holding to be too limited. 692 F.2d at 934. The
Weiss court also emphasized that the Supreme Court has used the language "deriva-
tive suit" in describing an action under § 36(b), thereby implying that the corpora-
tion was to have an implied cause of action. 692 F.2d at 934 (citing Burks v Lasker,
441 U.S. 471 (1979)). For a discussion of Burks, see note 81 and accompanying text
infra.
58. 692 F.2d at 935. The court noted that "any recovery obtained in a share-
holder suit reverts to the investment company." Id
59. Id The court acknowledged that legislative intent is the principal focus of
the Cort test. Id (citations omitted). The Weiss court believed that an absence of an
express authorization of an implied cause of action was to be expected because the
statute "does not purport to be the source of authority for managerial power; rather,
the Act functions primarily to 'impos[e] controls and restrictions on the internal manage-
ment of investment companies.' " Id (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478
(1979)) (emphasis in original).
60. 692 F.2d at 936. The Weiss court believed that the statute could be more
effectively enforced by a corporation than by a shareholder due to the corporation's
intimate knowledge of the adviser-fee contract and its superior financial resources.
Id.
61. Id The court believed that the grant of an express cause of action to the
shareholders "federalized this type of litigation," and made a companion remedy for
the investment company logically acceptable. Id
62. Id at 953. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
63. Id (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639
(1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 13 (1981)). For a discussion of the implication doctrine, see notes 46-57 and ac-
companying text supra. The commentators agree that cases following Cort have lim-
ited the availability ofan implied cause of action. See Note, A New Directionfor Imphed
Causes of Action, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 505 (1980).
64. 692 F.2d at 953 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons also disagreed
with the majority's analysis of the legislative history of § 36(b). He found evidence in
the legislative history which shows that Congress thought fund directors could not
deal effectively with the problems of adviser fees because of the nature of the mutual
12
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Consistent with this interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, Judge Gib-
bons felt the corporation could not assert a section 36(b) action. 65
Contemporaneous with the Weiss opinion, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc. ,66 held that an investment com-
pany does not have an implied cause of action under section 36(b). 67 The
Second Circuit first examined the language of the ICA and found no express
authorization for a direct suit by an investment company. 68 It rejected the
notion that the use of the words "on behalf of such company" in section
36(b) implied that the action was meant to be derivative.69 Furthermore,
the Fox court could not agree that because the plaintiffs had characterized
their action under section 36(b) as a "derivative" action, an implied cause of
action for the corporation necessarily followed. 70 In light of the "specific and
elaborate enforcement provision" in section 36(b) which authorizes both the
SEC and the security-holders of the investment company to enforce its re-
quirements, 71 the court stated that it would "not lightly assume an unex-
pressed intention to create additional" remedies. 72 Finally, the Second
Circuit searched the legislative history of section 36(b) for evidence of a con-
fund industry and its inherent conflict of interest. Id. at 951 (Gibbons, J. dissenting).
He maintained that a suit litigated by the fund, or a consent decree negotiated by the
fund, would preclude judicial review of fee levels. Id. at 950-51 (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing). He concluded that Congress could not have intended to create a private cause
of action in light of the specific provision for judicial review set forth in § 36(b)(2).
Id
65. Id. at 953 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
66. 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1982), cerl. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
67. Id at 261. Martin Fox, a shareholder of Daily Income Fund, Inc. ("Fund")
filed an action against the Fund's investment adviser Reich & Tang, Inc. (R & T),
alleging it had been paid excessive fees in violation of§ 36(b). Id at 252. R & T then
joined the Fund as a defendant. Id The fees R & T had been paid for its investment
advice were set at a fixed rate of one-half of one per cent of the Fund's net assets and
were not reduced despite an increase in Fund assets from approximately $75 million
in 1978 to $775 million in 1981. Id This increase in net assets resulted in an increase
in the fees paid to R & T from approximately $375,000 in 1978, to close to $4 million
in 1981. Id. at 253.
68. 692 F.2d at 254-55. The Fox court's reasoning followed Judge Gibbons' dis-
senting opinion in Weiss, and held that the proper standard for the creation of an
implied cause of action was the "clearly expressed congressional intent" test set forth
in Sea Clammers. Id at 255 (citing Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-15 (1981)). For a
discussion of Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion in Weiss, see notes 62-65 and accom-
panying text supra.
69. 692 F.2d at 255. The court noted that, normally, when Congress intends to
provide a corporation with a right to sue, it does so expressly. Id. at 255-56. From
this express provision the shareholders' derivative right of action would follow auto-
matically. Id
70. Id The court found it hard to "understand how a defect in a pleading-or a
misreading of § 36(b)-could] take precedence over the clear dictates of a statute."
Id. at 256.
71. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982).
For the text of this provision, see note 36 supra.
72. 692 F.2d at 255 (citing Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-15). For a discussion of
Sea Clammers, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 28: p. 978
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gressional intent to imply a private cause of action. 73 Finding that the prob-
lem of excessive adviser fees is "basically incompatible with a corporate right
of action as an effective solution,"'74 the court explained that the sole purpose
of the 1970 amendments was to facilitate shareholder derivative suits under
the Act. 75 Concluding that nothing in the legislative history indicated a
contrary intent, the Fox court refused to imply a corporate cause of action
under the statute.
76
B. The Interaction of Section 36(b) Sutts and Normal Demand Requirements
Assuming that an investment company may properly assert a cause of
action under section 36(b), thereby triggering the requirements of Rule
23.1, 7 7 a second issue which must be resolved is whether section 36(b) was
intended by Congress to require a demand by the shareholders of an invest-
ment company as a prerequisite to commencing suit. Several distinct argu-
ments for not requiring a demand have been advanced by plaintiffs who
have brought actions under section 36(b). First, it has been argued that the
legislative history of section 36(b) reveals a congressional intent to exempt an
action under that section from the requirements of Rule 23.1.78 This argu-
73. 692 F.2d at 256-61. The Fox court was bound by the Supreme Court's re-
quirement in Transamerica that a court search for persuasive evidence of a legislative
intent contrary to the statute's silence on the issue of an implied right of action. For a
discussion of Transamerica, see notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
74. 692 F.2d at 259. While the court acknowledged that Congress had intended
that independent directors act as "watchdogs" with respect to adviser fees, it found
that it "defies logic to conclude their contemplated role included suing their advis-
ers." Id.
75. Id. at 260-61. The court observed that Congress, in amending the Invest-
ment Company Act, was concerned not with the possibility of a suit by the fund, but
with "how to particularize the already existing statute to make judicial relief a genu-
ine possibility" for the shareholder of the fund. Id. For a discussion of the problems
shareholders encountered bringing suits to challenge excessive adviser fees prior to
the 1970 amendments, see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
76. 692 F.2d at 261. The court held that Rule 23.1 is never triggered and no
demand can be required in an action under § 36(b). Id.
77. For a discussion of the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, see note 5 supra.
78. See, e.g., Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d at 121. Recognizing the legislative
history's "emphasis on the prior ineffectiveness of independent directors with respect
to advisory fees, the need for strengthening then section 36, and the significant role of
the courts in determining the proper level of fees," the Grossman court found these
considerations consistent with requiring a demand pursuant to Rule 23.1. 674 F.2d
at 121-22 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1). The court also observed that there is lan-
guage in the legislative history referring to both the need to do away with "proce-
dural obstacles" and the need to provide "sufficient safeguards against frivolous or
harassing law suits." Id. at 122 (quoting Mutual Fund Amendments: Hearings on HR.
11995, S 2224, H.R. 13754 & HR. 147377 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 860 (1969);
Investment Company Act Amendments Act of 1969: Hearings on S 34 and S 296 Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 30 (1969)).
Other courts to have considered this argument have similarly rejected it. See,
e.g., Weiss, 692 F.2d at 936-38. The Weiss court found that "the legislative history
NOTE
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ment has not yet been accepted by any court 79 because the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are presumed to apply to any federal statute8 ° except where
Congress provides otherwise.
Based on dicta found in the Supreme Court's decision in Burks v.
Lasker,8 1 plaintiffs have also argued that requiring a demand would serve no
public purpose since a corporation's board of directors is precluded from
terminating a section 36(b) suit through the exercise of their "business judg-
ment."' 2 While other circuits have disagreed, the Second Circuit has stated
that, in light of the Supreme Court's dicta in Burks, "the traditional reason
for the demand requirement simply does not apply."'8 3 The First and Third
reflects an implicit understanding that Rule 23.1 would apply." Id. at 938 (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1). The Weiss court further found that demand was consistent
with the unaffiliated director's "watchdog" role. Id For a discussion of the Third
Circuit's decision in Wezrs, see notes 55-61 and accompanying text supra.
79. See Wess, 692 F.2d at 936 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the court's
alternative reasoning for rejecting this contention, see note 78 supra.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
81. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). In Burks, shareholders of a mutual fund brought an
action against the fund's investment adviser and several of its directors, charging
them with the negligent purchase of $20 million in Penn Central 270-day commercial
paper without first inquiring into the financial stability of that company. Id at 473-
74 & n.3. Soon thereafter, Penn Central filed a petition for reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act, resulting in the commercial paper's failure to reach maturity. Id at
474. A special committee of directors unaffiliated with the investment adviser was
appointed to review the suit. Id. This independent committee sought dismissal of
the suit, determining, with the help of outside counsel, that the suit was not in the
best interests of either the fund or its shareholders. Id The Court held that even
when the cause of action is federal, the courts must look to the state's business judg-
ment rule to determine whether an independent board of directors can terminate a
shareholder suit. Id at 486. The Court, however, noted that the federal courts only
must apply the state's business judgment rule when termination is consistent with the
policy of the federal statute in issue. Id The Burks Court cited § 36(b) as an example
of when termination is inconsistent with the policies of a federal statute. Id. at 484.
The Court stated, "[W]hen Congress [intended] to prevent board action from cutting
off derivative suits, it said so expressly. Section 36(b) . . .performs precisely this
function for derivative suits charging breach of fiduciary duty with respect to ad-
viser's fees." Id.
82. See, e.g., Wess, 692 F.2d at 939; Fox, 692 F.2d at 261; Grossman, 674 F.2d at
121.
83. Fox, 692 F.2d at 261. The Second Circuit believed that the traditional rea-
son for requiring demand before resorting to court interference in the internal affairs
of a private corporation could not be furthered in an action under § 36(b) because
the directors could neither take charge of the action themselves nor terminate the
suit. Id. (citing Comment, supra note 1, at 171-72).
Judge Gibbons, in his dissenting opinion in Weiss, agreed with, and elaborated
upon, the Second Circuit's reasoning in Fox. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 952-53 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting). Noting that the Second Circuit carries "particular authority" in cases
involving securities law, Judge Gibbons pointed out that the statute expressly pro-
vides that the directors' views be given only "such consideration . . . deemed appro-
priate under all the circumstances." Id at 952 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1976)). He contended that to require demand would be to
serve no purpose other than to allow the directors to delay the suit. Id. Because
§ 36(b) imposes a short statute of limitations on the period for which excessive fees
may be recovered, delay is especially harmful to plaintiffs. For a discussion of the
15
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Circuits, however, have held that, notwithstanding the dcta present in Burks,
other legitimate corporate purposes are served by requiring demand.
8 4
A third argument proffered by shareholder-plaintiffs compares section
36(b) of the ICA with section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which has been found by the courts not to be subject to Rule 23.1.85 Both
sections, it has been argued, are "instruments of public policy which should
not be hampered by procedural restrictions."'8 6 Further, it is asserted that a
cause of action under either statute should not be terminable by a decision of
the board of directors.87 The courts that have addressed this argument have
problem imposed by the statute of limitations in § 36(b), see notes 100-103 and ac-
companying text infra. For a further discussion of Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion
in Weiss, see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
84. See, e.g., Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 941-42. The Grossman
court, while recognizing that the statute could easily be read to place the ultimate
power to decide the excessiveness of adviser fees in the courts, concluded that de-
mand could still play an important role. 674 F.2d at 121. The Third Circuit, in
Weiss, elaborated on the alternative remedies which the board of directors might
pursue even if they are not able to terminate a shareholder suit. Weiss, 692 F.2d at
941-42. For example, the Weiss court observed that the 1970 amendment to the ICA
allows the directors to terminate the investment adviser contract with sixty-days no-
tice. Id at 942. The court also held that the directors could negotiate with the ad-
viser for a rebate of the excessive fees, satisfy the shareholder that the fees are
reasonable or that the litigation is not in the shareholder's best interest, or even take
control of the suit themselves. Id at 942 & n. 16. The plaintiff in Weiss had argued
that Burks stood for the proposition that the directors of a mutual fund are always too
interested to terminate a suit challenging the adviser fees. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 940.
The plaintiff in Weiss then argued that since the standard for termination and de-
mand are the same, demand should always be excused. Id The Weiss court found
the plaintiff's argument "superficially alluring . . . [but] ultimately unpersuasive."
Id at 940. The court distinguished Lewis v. Curtis, a Third Circuit case the Second
Circuit had cited in support of their acceptance of this argument. Id (citing Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1982)). In Lewis, the Third Circuit had found that the
standard used by a court in determining whether the disinterested directors may use
their "business judgment" to terminate a suit is also the same standard as that used
by the court to determine whether a demand will be presumed futile. Lewis v. Cur-
tis, 671 F.2d 779, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1982).
There is only one reported case in which the Burks decision has been used to
preclude a mutual fund's board of directors from using their business judgement to
terminate a § 36(b) action. In Evangehst v. Ftdelity Management & Research Co., the
District Court for the District of Massachusetts refused to dismiss a.claim brought
under § 36(b) where the trustees of a Massachusetts business trust registered under
the ICA refused to sue on behalf of the fund after demand was made by a share-
holder. Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., No. 81-536-2, Slip Op.
at 3-9 (D. Mass., December 6, 1982), leave to app. denied, - F.2d - (1st Cir. Janu-
ary 21, 1983). For a discussion of Burks, see note 81 supra.
85. See Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120. Courts have found that § 16(b) of the 1934
Act, which allows security-holders to recover "short swing" profits by insiders, is ex-
empt from the requirements of Rule 23.1. See, e.g., Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227
F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1957) (suits brought under
§ 16(b) exempt from contemporaneous ownership requirements of Rule 23.1). For
the text of§ 16(b), see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982). For the text of Rule 23.1, see note 5 supra.
86. Weis, 692 F.2d at 938-39.
87. See Burks, 441 U.S. at 484 n.13.
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rejected it, distinguishing section 36(b) from section 16(b) on the grounds
that the latter is subject to its own demand requirement and is therefore
exempt from the general requirements of Rule 23.1.88
Another argument which has been raised against a demand require-
ment is grounded on the fact that section 36(b) uses the language "security
holder" 89 while Rule 23.1 utilizes the term "shareholder. '"90 Advocates of
this position contend that this semantic distinction should allow suits under
section 36(b) by pure debenture-holders and other bare creditors who cannot
comply with the requirements of Rule 23.1.91 In Grossman, the only case to
address this contention, the First Circuit rejected this argument because it
determined that Congress intended the terms be used synonomously. 92
Finally, some courts have found that the one-year statute of limitation
which applies to damages recovered under section 36(b) is sufficient reason
to excuse demand altogether.9 3 The circuits which have accepted this argu-
ment have held that the one-year limitation provision in section 36(b) is in-
compatible with the normal delays incident to corporate decision-making
because in an action brought under section 36(b), the consequences of such
delay could be "severe." '94 Other courts, however, have disagreed, holding
that demand should be required since in most cases recovery would not be
reduced by any delay caused by the demand.95 Furthermore, in those cases
where demand would present an undue hardship, a court could allow the
suit to go forward after a limited time if the directors could be shown to be
causing "undue delay." '96
C. The Demand Requirement and Section 36(b). A Presumption of Futility
Even in situations where section 36(b) may require a demand, Rule 23.1
allows a plaintiff to avoid demand by demonstrating that its requirement
88. See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 938-39; Grossman, 674 F.2d at 120. Section 16(b) al-
lows the shareholder to bring an action only if "the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring
such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same
thereafter .... " Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982).
89. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976).
For the text of § 36(b) see notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. For the text of Rule 23.1, see note 5 supra.
91. See Grossman, 674 F.2d at 121.
92. Id (citations omitted). The court pointed out that the term "shareholder"
was used throughout the legislative history of § 36(b). Id
93. See, e.g., id. at 122; Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F.
Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). § 36(b)(3) provides that "[n]o award of damages
shall be recoverable for any period prior to one year before the action was instituted."
Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1982).
94. See Weiss, 692 F.2d at 951 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See also Fox, 692 F.2d at
261-62; Blatt v. Dean Witter Reynolds Intercapital, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1152, 1156
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
95. Weiss, 692 F.2d at 938.
96. Grossman, 674 F.2d at 122.
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would be futile.97 It has been successfully argued that, due to the nature of
the relationship between the board of directors of a mutual fund and the
investment adviser,9 8 demand should always be presumed futile. Conse-
quently, the pleading requirements of Rule 23.1 are satisfied by general alle-
gations that the mutual fund's board of directors was under the control of
the investment adviser.9 9 In Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc. ,00 the first case to
address this issue, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York recognized that, under traditional demand requirements, such
general allegations of improper influence would not be sufficient.10 1 How-
ever, concluding that section 36(b) was a "new type of derivative action,"
the court went on to hold that demand will bepresumed futile in a section
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
98. For a discussion of the mutual fund-investment adviser relationship, see
notes 22-25 and accompanying text, supra.
99. See Boyko v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This
argument has also been recently advanced by other § 36(b) plaintiffs. See, e.g., Fox,
692 F.2d at 261; Weiss, 692 F.2d at 943; Grossman, 674 F.2d at 115.
100. 68 F.R.D. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Boyko, a shareholder of Reserve Fund,
Inc. ("Fund") brought an action against the Fund and its investment adviser, Re-
serve Management Corporation, alleging that the compensation paid under the ad-
viser-fee contract had become "excessive and unreasonable in the light of the
mushrooming growth of the Fund assets and the minimum number of investment
decisions and volume of advice required from the manager to keep said assets in-
vested in the many market instruments utilized by the Fund." Id at 693. The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the requirements
of Rule 23.1. Id at 694. The complaint admitted that no demand had been made,
but alleged that two of the Fund's directors were also directors of the investment
adviser, owned all of its stock, and that the Fund's board of directors was controlled
by the investment adviser. Id.
101. Id at 696. The court noted that in a normal derivative action, mere con-
clusory allegations of bias and self-interest on the part of the corporate directors,
absent specific factual underpinnings, would not be sufficient to excuse demand. Id.
at 694.
The Boyko court distinguished an earlier First Circuit case in which the court
had determined that similar allegations, in a complaint charging a conspiracy to fix
adviser fees in violation of antitrust laws, were insufficient to excuse demand finding
that that action had been brought before the enactment of§ 36(b). Boyko, 68 F.R.D.
at 696 (citing In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264-65 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)). But see Galfand v. Chestnutt, 402 F. Supp. 1318
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 943
(1978) (demand excused where defendant-directors of a mutual fund had already
"tenaciously and effectively" resisted plaintiffs previous attempts to enjoin a share-
holder meeting at which a new adviser contract was ratified).
The circuits do not agree on the standards to be applied in determining whether
the demand requirement should be excused. 3B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.1.19, 254 (2d ed. 1975). See also Abbe v. Gross, 411 F. Supp. 923, 924
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). While some circuits will allow unsupported allegations of control to
excuse demand, most require specific factual allegations in the pleadings. Compare de
Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), af/d, 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970) (general allegation of control sufficient to excuse demand) with In re
Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973) and Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (requiring specific factual allegations of control).
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36(b) suit whenever it has been alleged that there are one or more directors
on the mutual fund's board who are affiliated with the investment ad-
viser.' 02 Although the Boyko decision has never been overruled, it has not
been followed in the other circuits.10
3
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND SECTION 36(b)
IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON
THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION
Three separate questions have been raised by litigants and addressed by
the courts regarding the relationship between the demand requirement and
section 36(b):10 4 first, does the investment company have an implied right of
action under section 36(b) thereby triggering the demand requirement; sec-
ond, did Congress intend the demand requirement be applied to section
36(b); and finally, should demand always be presumed futile in a section
36(b) suit. It is submitted, however, that the proper resolution of the first
and threshold issue of whether the mutual fund itself may bring a private
action under section 36(b) would render the resolution of the two remaining
issues unnecessary. 105 It is further submitted that the most recent Supreme
102. Boyko, 68 F.R.D. at 696. The Boyko court held that "affiliated" meant "in-
terested person" as that term is defined in § 2(a)(19) of the Act. Id. (citing Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1976). The court
stated that the control which an adviser asserts over a mutual fund is a result of the
nature of the industry and intangible factors which could not specifically be pleaded.
68 F.R.D. at 696. The court noted that a strict application of the demand require-
ment would lead to the dismissal of most suits brought under § 36(b). Id Therefore,
the court concluded that a strict interpretation of the statute would render the inten-
tions of Congress meaningless. Id.
103. See, e.g., Markowitz v. Brody, 90 F.R.D. 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Unter-
meyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust, 79 F.R.D. 36, 44 (D. Mass. 1978). In Marko-
witz, the court concluded that the Boyko decision's primary concern was that non-
interested directors would be able to terminate the suit if demand were required. 90
F.R.D. at 558-59. The Markowtz court then determined that the concern voiced in
Boyko was no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burks which
seemed to preclude director termination of§ 36(b) suits. Id. For further discussion of
Burks, see note 81 supra.
The Untermeyer court similarly refused to follow the Boyko reasoning and held
that there would be no presumption of futility even where it is alleged that 50% of a
fund's board of directors is "affiliated" with the investment adviser. 79 F.R.D. at 44.
One commentator has severely questioned the Boyko decision, finding its reasoning
"suspect." Comment, The Demand and Standng Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Ac-
tions, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 168, 177 (1979). Another commentator has, however,
agreed with the Boyko holding because it lessens the overly burdensome obstacle of
the demand requirement. See Note, Derivative Suits: Director Demand Under Rule 23. 1 and
Section 36(b) ofthe Investment Company Act, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 565, 579 (1976).
104. For a discussion of these three issues, see notes 36-103 and accompanying
text supra.
105. For a discussion of the implied right of action under § 36(b), see notes 50-
76 and accompanying text supra. A finding by the Court that a mutual fund does
have an implied right of action under § 36(b) would cause the demand requirement
of Rule 23.1 to be applicable making it necessary for the Court to resolve the other
issues raised by the interaction of § 36(b) and the demand requirement. These issues
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Court decisions on implied rights of action compel a finding that the mutual
fund itself does not have the right to assert an action under section 36(b).10 6
If the mutual fund itself did not have an implied private right of action, a
suit by a shareholder would not constitute an attempt to "enforce a right
which may properly be asserted" by the corporation and Rule 23.1 would
therefore be inapplicable. 107
This is the result which was reached by the Second Circuit in Fox 108
and by Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit in his dissent in Weiss. 109 After
determining that section 36(b) does not expressly confer a right of action on
the mutual fund, the Fox panel and Judge Gibbons examined both the statu-
tory scheme of the ICA and its legislative history in search of affirmative
evidence that Congress intended the mutual fund to have an implied right of
action." 0 It is suggested that this two-step analysis reflects the approach
mandated by the Supreme Court in Touche Ross and Transamerica. 111 Having
found nothing to indicate such congressional intent, the Second Circuit and
Judge Gibbons correctly concluded that section 36(b) does not give rise to an
implied right of action.'' 2 This interpretation of the legislative history of
section 36(b), correctly indicates that the congressional purpose in amending
the ICA to include section 36(b) was simply to increase the availability of
suits by shareholders challenging excessive adviser fees.' 13
It is suggested that the decisions of the First Circuit in Grossman and
Third Circuit in Weiss, both of which found an implied right of action under
section 36(b), 114 are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in
Touche Ross, Transamerica and the cases which have followed,." 5 In Grossman,
the First Circuit failed to discuss any of the relevant Supreme Court cases in
would include whether Congress intended the demand requirement to apply to
§ 36(b) and whether demand should be presumed futile due to the structure of the
mutual fund and the inherent conflict of interest existing between the fund and its
investment adviser. See notes 77-103 & 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
106. For a discussion of Cori, Touche Ross, and Transamerica, see notes 39-46 and
accompanying text supra.
107. For the text of Rule 23.1, see note 5 supra.
108. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's opinion in Fox, see notes 66-76 and
accompanying text supra.
109. For a discussion of Judge Gibbons' dissent in Weiss, see notes 62-65 and
accompanying text supra.
110. For a discussion of Fox and Judge Gibbons' dissent in Weiss, see notes 62,
63 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
111. For a discussion of the approach mandated in Touche Ross and Transamerica,
see note 46 and accompanying text supra.
112. For a discussion of the reasoning of the Second Circuit and Judge Gibbons,
see notes 63 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
113. For a discussion of the Congressional purpose in amending the ICA, see
notes 28-32 & 75 and accompanying text supra.
114. For a discussion of Grossman and Wetss, see notes 51-61 and accompanying
text supra.
115. For a discussion of these cases, see notes 44-49 and accompanying text
supra.
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finding an implied right of action. 1 16 Further, in critiquing the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in Weiss, it appears that the court applied the four-factor Cori
test without considering Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Cori, in
which the availability of implied rights of action under a federal statute had
been further limited.' 
17
While both of these courts found the legislative history of section 36(b)
silent on the question of congressional intent,1 18 it is suggested that both
courts failed to recognize that, under Transamerica, such silence crates a
"strong presumption" against a finding that Congress intended to imply a
cause of action under the statute.' 19 Neither the Weiss nor the Grossman
courts were able to rebut this presumption. Therefore, their creation of an
implied right of action without an affirmative showing that Congress in-
tended such a result was improper. As further support for this argument, it
is suggested that the Sea Clammers decision requires that a stronger showing
of Congressional intent be made where the statute in question provides both
an express remedy and a mechanism for its enforcement. 120 Section 36(b)
expressly provides for a specific remedy which can be enforced only by the
Securities Exchange Commission or a mutual fund shareholder.121 There-
fore, an even stronger showing that Congress intended that the mutual fund
have a cause of action was necessary before such an action could be implied,
a showing the Weiss and Grossman courts could not make. 122
V. CONCLUSION
Section 36(b) of the ICA affords necessary protection to mutual fund
shareholders. 123 Requiring that demand be made on the directors of a mu-
tual fund before an action is brought under section 36(b) unnecessarily limits
this protection by placing an unreasonable burden on mutual fund share-
holders.' 24 This is arguably a burden which Congress never contem-
plated, 125 and one that can not be justified in light of the rationales
116. For a discussion of Grossman see notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
117. For a discussion of Weiss see notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
118. See note 59 supra.
119. 444 U.S. at 18. See note 46 supra.
120. For a discussion of Sea Clammers, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text
supra.
121. See Investment Company Act of 1940, § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)
(1982).
122. For a discussion of Wezs and Grossman, see notes 51-61 and accompanying
text supra.
123. For a discussion of why § 36(b) was necessary to protect shareholders, see
notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
124. The demand requirement leads to unnecessary delay and can possibly limit
shareholder recovery in a § 36(b) suit. See notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text
supra.
125. Furthermore, if Congress did not intend the mutual fund to have an im-
plied cause of action under § 36(b), they would have known that no demand would
be required. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
arguments supporting the proposition that Congress never intended the demand re-
[Vol. 28: p. 978
21
Flick: The Demand Requirement of Rule 23.1 in Actions Brought under Sect
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
1982-83] NOTE
normally given for the imposition of a demand requirement.' 26
In reviewing the Fox decision, the Supreme Court should affirm the Sec-
ond Circuit's opinion and deny the mutual fund an implied right of action
under section 36(b). It is suggested that for the Court to do otherwise would
be to undercut their previous mandate that a private right of action should
be implied under a federal statute only when it can be shown that Congress
intended such a result.
127
Lawrence F Flick, II
quirement be applied in a § 36(b) action, see notes 77-96 and accompanying text
supra.
126. For a discussion of these rationales see note 83 supra.
127. One reason given to explain the Court's desire to limit implied causes of
action is to decrease the case load burdens of the Federal court system. Justice Ste-
vens, dissenting in Middlesex, stated that "fi]n recent years . . . a Court that is prop-
erly concerned about the burdens imposed upon the Federal Judiciary, the quality of
the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been
more and more reluctant to open the courthouse to the injured citizen." 453 U.S. at
24-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Allowing the mutual fund to assert an implied right of
action under § 36(b) would make the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure applicable and would possibly allow the fund directors
to pursue other remedies or give them the time necessary to settle the litigation. See
text accompanying notes 34 & 84 supra. Implying a cause of action under § 36(b)
would make it incumbent on shareholders to assert a demand upon the corporation
prior to instituting suit. Thus, the implication of a right of action, contrary to the
usual effect of implication, would reduce, not increase the case load of the federal
courts.
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